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ARMY SUPPLY REPORT

REPORT YEAR-1967

1st Battalion 20th Infantry  
2d Brigade 4th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96322

*[Handwritten signature]*

Report Made by

Date: 25 February 1968

*[Handwritten signature]*

Office of the Sg1  
1st Battalion 20th Infantry  
APO San Francisco 96322

GEORGE J. BISHOP  
Sg1, Infantry  
Commanding

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
FORWARD.....	2
ABBREVIATIONS.....	3
CHAPTER I - ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION	
SECTION I - MISSION.....	4
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION.....	5
SECTION III - COMMANDER'S BIOGRAPHY.....	6
SECTION IV - CRITICAL POSITIONS.....	7-8
CHAPTER II - MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS	
SECTION I - OPERATIONS.....	9-18
SECTION II - TRAINING.....	19
SECTION III - LOGISTICS.....	20
SECTION IV - CIVIC ACTIONS.....	21-22

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## FOREWARD

This historical supplement is a narrative report of significant events which occurred within and the major accomplishments of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, in the Republic of Vietnam during the period 1 January 1967 through 31 December 1967.

The year's activities proved again the adaptability of the United States Army Infantry Battalion. An organization that had been developed in the years following the Korean War was with little difficulty adapted to the requirements of counterinsurgency operations in the Central Highland's more populated areas, adapted to capitalize on helicopters, adapted to operate in the Southeast Asian monsoons and adapted to fight the mass formations of the North Vietnamese Army.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Abn.....	Airborne
AO.....	Area of Operations
Bde.....	Brigade
CA.....	Combat Assault
CP.....	Command Post
DS.....	Direct Support
EM.....	Enlisted Man
FSB.....	Fire Support Base
GO.....	General Order
KIA.....	Killed in Action
LP.....	Listening Post
LRRP.....	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LZ.....	Landing Zone
NVA.....	North Vietnamese Army
Off.....	Officer
OPCON.....	Operational Control
Recon Plat.....	Reconnaissance Platoon
RVN.....	Republic of Vietnam
TOE.....	Table of Organization and Equipment
VC.....	Viet Cong
VMC.....	Viet Montagnard Cong
WIA.....	Wounded in Action

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## Chapter I: Organization and Administration

### SECTION I: Mission

To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack.

Effective 1 January 1967 to 9 September 1967

27 Oct 67 32 750 18

Effective 10 September 1967 to 31 December 1967

15 Oct 67 32 750 18

SECTION II: Organization

SECTION III: Commander's Biography

TCE.....7-15E

burgh, Pennsylvania. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Forestry from Pennsylvania State College in 1961 and a Master of Education in Guidance

GO 111.....Effective 1 January 1967 to 9 September 1967

37 Off...2 WO...750 EM

GO 149.....Effective 10 September 1967 to 31 December 1967

45 Off...2 WO...924 EM

The reorganization from General Order 111 to General Order 149 was to incorporate into the TCE a fourth rifle company, Company D, and a combat support company, Company E; both changes to increase the combat effectiveness of the Infantry Battalion in the Republic of Vietnam.

He has also been awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge (2d award), the Air Medal with 1st through 4th Oak Leaf Clusters and the Purple Heart.

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## SECTION III: Commander's Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Birch was born on 1 May 1929 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He earned a Bachelor of Science in Forestry from Pennsylvania State College in 1951 and a Master of Education in Guidance and Counseling from Colorado State University in 1960. Lieutenant Colonel Birch was commissioned in the Regular Army upon graduation from under graduate school as a Distinguished Military Graduate. He has attended both the Basic and Advanced Infantry Officer's Training courses at The Infantry School, The United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1965, and The United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1967, (Faculty Diploma).

He assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, on 2 August 1967. He was awarded the Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device for valor along with the 1st and 2d Oak Leaf Clusters for heroic actions against the enemy on 1 October 1967, 14 November 1967 and 26 November 1967. Lieutenant Colonel Birch has also been awarded the Combat Infantryman's Badge (2d award), the Air Medal with 1st through 4th Oak Leaf Clusters and the Purple Heart.

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## SECTION IV: Critical Positions

### Bn CO

LTC Harold B Birch  
 LTC Corey J Wright  
 MAJ Grady W Williams  
 LTC George Wilcox  
 LTC James R Lay

2 Aug 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 3 Apr 67 - 1 Aug 67  
 3 Mar 67 - 2 Apr 67  
 13 Feb 67 - 2 Mar 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 12 Feb 67

### Bn XO

MAJ Basil R Adams Jr  
 MAJ George P Long III  
 MAJ Charles F Scofield  
 MAJ Barney K Neal Jr

10 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 5 Sep 67 - 9 Dec 67  
 19 Feb 67 - 4 Sep 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 18 Feb 67

### Bn S1

CPT Perry S White  
 CPT Alfredo C Giddals  
 CPT Louis A K Sylvester  
 CPT James E Bigelow II  
 1LT Eugene W Echols Jr

16 Sep 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 21 Jul 67 - 15 Sep 67  
 15 Jun 67 - 20 Jul 67  
 15 Jan 67 - 14 Jun 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 14 Jan 67

### Bn S2

CPT Joe W Green  
 CPT Lance L Willdermood  
 CPT James O Davoli  
 MAJ Thomas V Borlund  
 CPT Warren S Morimoto  
 CPT Joseph K Witkowski  
 CPT Michael C Downs  
 CPT Brendan T Quann  
 1LT Michael C Downs

15 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 23 Nov 67 - 14 Dec 67  
 20 Sep 67 - 12 Nov 67  
 7 Aug 67 - 19 Sep 67  
 20 Jul 67 - 6 Aug 67  
 12 Jul 67 - 19 Jul 67  
 21 Jun 67 - 11 Jul 67  
 10 Jan 67 - 20 Jun 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 9 Jan 67

### Bn S3

CPT Lee F Kleese  
 MAJ Thomas V Borlund  
 MAJ Lawrence A Gardner  
 CPT Jerry W White  
 CPT Paul E Freeman

21 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 20 Sep 67 - 20 Dec 67  
 4 Jun 67 - 19 Sep 67  
 1 Feb 67 - 3 Jun 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 31 Jan 67

### Bn S4

CPT Bruce R Black  
 CPT Robert L Sheldon  
 CPT Douglas P Bennett  
 1LT Louis A K Sylvester

19 Nov 67 - 31 Dec 67  
 16 Jun 67 - 18 Nov 67  
 1 Feb 67 - 15 Jun 67  
 1 Jan 67 - 31 Jan 67



SECTION IV: Critical Positions

Bn S5

1LT James L King  
CPT Joseph K Witkowski  
CPT Louis A K Sylvester

15 Nov 67 - 31 Dec 67  
20 Jul 67 - 3 Nov 67  
4 Jun 67 - 19 Jul 67

CO HHC

CPT Charles T Swanson  
1LT Charles H Bracker II  
CPT Warren S Morimoto  
CPT Perry S White  
CPT Louis A K Sylvester  
CPT Edward D Northrop Jr

15 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
9 Nov 67 - 14 Dec 67  
17 Sep 67 - 8 Nov 67  
3 May 67 - 16 Sep 67  
15 Jan 67 - 2 May 67  
1 Jan 67 - 14 Jan 67

CO Co A

CPT Lawrence F Cousins  
CPT Ted G Morgan  
CPT Warren S Morimoto  
CPT Thomas V Borlund  
CPT Robert E Taggs  
1LT Brendan T Quann

20 Nov 67 - 31 Dec 67  
10 Sep 67 - 19 Nov 67  
7 Aug 67 - 9 Sep 67  
25 Jun 67 - 6 Aug 67  
11 Jan 67 - 24 Jun 67  
1 Jan 67 - 10 Jan 67

CO Co B

CPT Ted G Morgan  
CPT Charles T Swanson  
CPT David A Druzyn  
CPT Brian W Rushton  
CPT Edward V Scherer  
1LT Melvin E Case

3 Dec 67 - 31 Dec 67  
24 Nov 67 - 2 Dec 67  
13 Jul 67 - 23 Nov 67  
2 Jul 67 - 12 Jul 67  
12 Jan 67 - 1 Jul 67  
1 Jan 67 - 11 Jan 67

CO Co C

CPT Joseph K Witkowski  
CPT Joe W Green  
CPT Donald R Moore  
CPT Edward D Northrop Jr  
1LT James E Bigelow II

4 Nov 67 - 31 Dec 67  
28 Jul 67 - 3 Nov 67  
5 Jun 67 - 27 Jul 67  
15 Jan 67 - 4 Jun 67  
1 Jan 67 - 14 Jan 67

CO Co D

CPT George H Wilkins III

10 Sep 67 - 31 Dec 67

CO Co E

1LT David R Jennings

10 Sep 67 - 31 Dec 67

## Chapter II: Major Accomplishments

## SECTION I: Operations

The year 1967 opened for the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, with intelligence indicating a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) build up west of the Nam Sathay River and increased activity in the village area surrounding 3 Tango, YA852452, and the Oasis, ZA118277. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry's mission was to conduct search and destroy operations within the 2d Brigade (Bde), 4th Infantry Division area of operations. (AO)

Initially a fire support base (FSB) was secured at YA765493 with Company C; the Command Group; Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery; the battalion 4.2" Mortar Platoon; five 81mm mortars and one squad from the 1st Platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion. Companies A and C conducted search and destroy operations to the south and west of the FSB. On 2 February, Company A moved overland and secured landing zone (LZ) 10B at YA760386. The remainder of the battalion followed by air. On 9 February the Reconnaissance Platoon (Recon Plat) made a combat assault (CA) into an LZ at YA714385.

On 10 February the NVA buildup west of the Nam Sathay became a reality and the battalion was taxed to establish a FSB at LZ 501N, YA602540. On 12 February, Company C was placed under the operational control of (OPCON) the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, and moved overland to secure LZ 501N. During this move LTC George Wilcox assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Company C closed LZ 501N on the evening of 14 February. At EMNT on 15 February, Company C was attacked by the 8th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment. Although heavy contact continued throughout the day until 152400

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February, Companies A, B and the Command Group were able to close LZ 501N at 151730 February. The battle proved to be a major victory for the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, and a kill ratio of ten to one was compiled. At 172255 February the FSB received fifty rounds of 82mm mortar fire. All rounds landed outside the perimeter and there were no friendly casualties. The following morning the Recon Plat located and destroyed three enemy mortar positions.

At 251100 February at YA590538, Company A encountered the 2d Company, K-7 Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment. The ensuing battle lasted for the entire day with the NVA forces breaking contact at 1915 hours. Again superiority was established over the enemy with a 24 to 1 kill ratio.

On 26 and 27 February minor contacts were made at YA583535 by a 2d Bde Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) OPCON to the battalion and by the 1st Platoon of Company B at YA602541 which resulted in five enemy killed in action (KIA) and two friendly KIA.

On 3 March Major Grady Williams assumed command of the battalion. That evening the FSB received forty rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in two friendly KIA and sixteen friendly wounded in action (WIA). At 040145 March the FSB received forty more rounds of 82mm mortar fire with negative casualties. The mortar positions were located and destroyed on the morning of 4 March 1967.

On 8 March the battalion CA'd into LZ 519A at YA668663 and continued their search and destroy mission. On the 13th and 14th the 2d Bde Command Post (CP) at 3 Tango, YA852542, received two hundred rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the south and consequently the battalion received the mission to

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N106 ZT 501M

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relocate southwest of 3 Tango at LZ 10B, YA760336. Company B CA'd into LZ 10B on 16 March and discovered it mined and occupied by a reinforced squad from the 95B NVA Regiment. The NVA were driven off with negative friendly casualties. At 162000 March the FSB received thirty-five rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in seven WIA's. On 17 March both the Recon Plat at YA765391 and Company C at YA763377 engaged reinforced NVA squads from the 95B NVA Regiment resulting in two friendly KIA, thirteen friendly WIA and fourteen enemy KIA. On 17 March Companies A and C found mined LZ's similar to the mined LZ at 10B. On 24 March a Company B listening post (LP) sighted three NVA soldiers at YA686341 and killed one of them.

On 3 April LTC Corey J Wright assumed command of the battalion and on 5 April after ninety-five days of combat operations, Operation San Houston terminated and operation Francis Marion began.

On 10 April the battalion relocated by air and motor march to a Special Forces camp at Polei Kleng, ZA027936. On 16 April Company C air lifted from Polei Kleng to the II Corps heli-pad and then established a patrol base at ZA231492. They then became a II Corps reaction force. Search and destroy operations for the remainder of the battalion at Polei Kleng proved fruitless and on 18 April the battalion (-) air lifted into a FSB just north of the Special Forces camp at Plei Me, ZA160066. Two days later the FSB again relocated to ZA023085.

The remainder of April was spent relocating Montagnard villages under the Edap Ehang Program which involved seven villages and 833 Montagnards. On 1 May Company A was air lifted from the FSB to ZA152209 and operated with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized). Companies B and C continued search and destroy operations north and west of the FSB. A pro-

visional element consisting of personnel from the battalion, the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized) and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade from the Trains at the Oasis was furnished to assist the Recon Plat in providing security for the FSB. On 4 May, Company A returned to the battalion and CA'd into an area west of the FSB. The remainder of May was spent in search and destroy operations west of the Oasis with negative enemy contact.

On 1 June the battalion relocated the FSB to YA845256 just east of the Duc Co Special Forces/Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Camp. Company B provided FSB security while Companies A and C conducted search and destroy operations on the high ground north and west of Duc Co. On 7 June, Company C and the Command Group moved to establish a new FSB at YA889136.

On 14 June, Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was placed OPCON to the battalion. Company B was airlifted to YA911148 assuming a surveillance mission in that area and Company A was airlifted to base camp for a very welcome five day stand down.

At 151510 June a LRRP in the battalion AO made contact with an estimated two to three NVA squads which resulted in three NVA KIA. One platoon of Company B linked up with the LRRP for a search of the area with negative results. At 151710 June another LRRP made contact in the battalion AO and a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was CA'd into the area but a thorough search again provided negative results.

On 20 June, Company A returned to the AO and Company B started a five day stand down at base camp. During the stand down, at 220012 June, one reinforced platoon from Company B conducted a night CA and cordoned a village at ZA762261. The village search was made and the element returned to base camp with negative results. At 250010 another platoon of Company B conducted

a night CA to the vicinity of ZA105411, established a blocking force, linked up with elements of the 1st Battalion, 10th Cavalry and returned to base camp with negative contact. On 27 June, Company C came to base camp for their stand down and Company B returned to the AO. During the period 27 June through 11 July the FSB remained at YA889136 and the companies continued search and destroy and surveillance missions within the battalion AO however, more and more intelligence pointed to a large NVA build up in the area of the Ia Drang Valley and north along the Cambodian border. Two NVA Regiments, the 66th and the 88th were reported to be astride the battalion AO in the Cambodian sanctuary. Additional information received on the evenings of 9 and 10 July indicated that the enemy forces were apparently on the flanks and possibly to the rear of Companies B and C with the intent to fix forces and attack. Throughout the morning of 12 July there was sporadic enemy contact with Companies B and C and at approximately 1130 hours an estimated NVA Regiment attacked Company B in force while a smaller enemy force kept Company C in place. Heavy casualties were received but the men continued to fight bravely despite the overwhelming odds and the fact that their company commander had been mortally wounded. Casualties were one hundred and fifty-two enemy KIA versus thirty-two friendly KIA and twenty-eight WIA. Companies A and C spent the 13th and 14th searching the battle area for seven missing in action with negative results.

On 17 July the FSB displaced to YA929151 with Company B providing FSB security and Companies A and C continuing search and destroy missions in the vicinities YA905098 and YA929151 respectively. From 18 July to 1 August search and destroy operations were conducted by Companies A and C and Company B remained in the FSB providing security and training replacements.

On 2 August 1967, LTC Harold B. Birch assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Search and destroy operations were continued with two rifle companies in the AO complimented by Bde LRRP's until the FSB displaced to YA922202 on 10 August. Operations continued during the next ten days with no significant results. On 20 August the battalion and supporting elements were placed OPCON to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and continued search and destroy operations in the same area. The battalion reverted to the 2d Brigade again on 25 August. During the period 25 through 31 August, Montagnard Platoon 4J was attached to the battalion and conducted independent operations in the AO. Company B received sniper fire at ZA001263 on 30 August but achieved negative results during a sweep of the area.

On 21 August the battalion received the men who were to form Company D. They immediately set to work polishing up their training and displaced with the FSB on 7 September as the battalion reserve/reaction force.

On 18 September the FSB moved to ZA133472 into an LZ secured by Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mechanized) which remained OPCON to the battalion until 23 September 1967 providing FSB security and conducting dismounted operations with the company (-). Artillery support from the FSB was provided by Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery. On 18 September Companies B and C moved by air from their previous AO and CA'd into assigned Company AO's. Companies D and A moved by air from their AO to the FSB on 18 and 19 September respectively, departing the immediate vicinity of the FSB to conduct cordon and search operations at villages in their assigned company AO's on the morning of 20 September. 2d

Bde LRRP H2A, one of four LRRP teams operating in the AO killed one NVA soldier on 20 September. Company B killed another NVA soldier the same day. Sporadic automatic weapons fire delivered from concealed positions was common throughout the period reaching its peak on 22 September with contact by Companies A, B, and D in which there was one friendly WIA. All four rifle companies closed in the vicinity of the FSB that evening in preparation for a motor march to base camp and subsequent CA into a new battalion AO.

On 23 September all forward elements of the battalion closed base camp and were immediately CA'd into VC Valley southeast of Pleiku for operation "Poison Ivy". The new FSB was located at BR101268. On the evening of 24 September the FSB received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with no casualties. Countermortar fire was initiated and followed by air strikes. During the remainder of September there were a number of minor contacts, primarily small arms and mortar fire, that resulted in two NVA KIA, two Viet Cong (VC) KIA, 1 NVA Prisoner of War (POW) and two Viet Montagnard Cong (VMC) KIA with no friendly KIA. On 1 October, following a sighting of several NVA squads, Company B CA'd into the area. Results of this operation were forty NVA KIA and five NVA POW in addition to numerous weapons and items of equipment. Friendly casualties were one KIA and one WIA. On the same day other elements reported one NVA KIA and one VMC KIA. During the period 2 October through 11 October there were no significant contacts.

On 12 October, Company B with an advance party from the FSB moved to a marshalling area in Cheo Reo at BQ377470. The remainder of the battalion followed on the 13th. During the period 13 October through 21 October there were no significant happenings.



On 1 November 1967, the FSB was located at AQ814376. Company A went OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry; Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry; two CIDG companies, one from Ban Blech and one from Van Don; and one regional force company from Quang Nheiu, Darlac Province, were OPCON to the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. In addition to the normal Direct Support (DS) Battery, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery; Batteries B and C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery were positioned to support the battalion and were protected by elements thereof. The battalion continued to move companies in an effort to locate and destroy elements of the 33d NVA Regiment known to be in the area. Company A killed one NVA and captured another who were exfiltrating from the area and on 3 November the CIDG company from Ban Blech surprised five NVA/VC at AQ898403. The battalion Recon Plat discovered a cache containing 3,000 pounds of rice. At 2155 hours, Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery were attacked in their FSB by mortars. This was followed by a ground attack. Simultaneously the battalion FSB was also attacked by mortars and suffered one KIA and 6 WIA while killing thirty-seven of the enemy.

Between 4 and 8 November the battalion continued to exert pressure and received sporadic small arms fire. On 9 November the FSB was again attacked and received thirty rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in one KIA and ten WIA. The following day the FSB displaced and colocated with one of the Self Propelled (SP) batteries at AQ885275. On 14 November 1967 Company D encountered two enemy reconnaissance parties and inflicted two KIA's. On that evening the FSB was again mortared receiving forty rounds resulting in one KIA and nine WIA. Between 14 and 19 November no significant sightings occurred.

8th  
went

The battalion moved by Air Force aircraft on 20 November from Ban Me Thout to Dak To. Upon arrival Companies A and D were attached to the 173d Airborne (Abn) Bde and the battalion (-) occupied a portion of the perimeter at the Dak To airfield while conducting local patrolling. On 21 November, a mortar attack on the perimeter failed to cause any casualties.

On 22 November, the entire battalion was placed OPCON to the 173d Abn Bde. Task Force (TF) Long (Companies A and D) was air assaulted into an LZ southeast of Hill 875. The force suffered 3 casualties from ground fire. TF Long assumed control of a MIKE force company upon arrival in the LZ and a reconnaissance in force revealed little or no defense of the south slope of Hill 875. The battalion (-) moved by road to Ban Hett Special Forces Camp. Company C was air assaulted to join TF Long on the south slope of Hill 875 on 23 November 1967 and in the morning of 23 November Company D, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry seized the south half of Hill 875. On 24 November 1967 the battalion relieved the 4th Battalion, 503d Abn in place and TF Long occupied and prepared to defend Hill 875. At 1720 hours the NVA simultaneously attacked all three elements of the battalion resulting in two friendly WIA. Company A captured an NVA from the 174th Regiment on 25 November who had dug himself out of a bunker on Hill 875. On that same day the battalion returned to control of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div. On 26 November at 1744 hours the FSB and all elements on Hill 875 were subjected to a heavy mortar attack. The FSB received twelve rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Companies A and D on Hill 875 received one hundred and fifty rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Total battalion casualties were five KIA and eighteen WIA. The attack ended at 1828 hours. Mortar, artillery, and Air Force flare ships were employed in a counterbattery role. The incoming mortar rounds ignited a fire which threat-

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SECTION I

Three

to conduct

ened to destroy the FSB until brought under control at 2300 hours.

The FSB displaced to YB855186 on 29 November, assuming control of the AO and FSB of the 2d Battalion, 503d Abn. The battalion forces moved from Hill 875 to adjacent terrain features.

On 10 December the battalion moved to Dak To airfield and on 11 December moved by road to establish a FSB at ZA107684, vicinity of Plei Mrong and at the same time returned to the control of 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Operations in the area included cordon and search with close coordination in the employment of CSF forces from Plei Mrong. Contact with the enemy forces, primarily VC was sporadic throughout the period. Company D killed a two man enemy recon force on 18 December. On 24 December General Harold K. Johnson visited the battalion FSB and Christmas was celebrated as best as possible the following day. There was no significant action during the remainder of the year.

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## SECTION II: Training

Throughout the year maximum advantage was taken of every opportunity to conduct training. This training was primarily conducted at the Fire Support Base, although certain subjects, such as the adjustment of artillery fire were conducted at company patrol bases as the tactical situation permitted. Emphasis was placed on firing of captured enemy weapons. During late August and early September the new Company D received individual and unit training at both the division base camp and the fire support base enabling the personnel to operate under their new organization and environment.

### SECTION III: Logistics

As the year began and continuing through mid-May the battalion was furnished two helicopters a day. One was utilized as a command and control ship and the other in a resupply role. The unit was initially hampered when our helicopter allotment was reduced to one a day but soon learned how to employ it effectively. Resupply was aided throughout the year by CH 47 "Chinook" helicopters. The battalion trains operated at the Oasis until 18 September when it moved to base camp from which it supported operations west of Pleiku and in VC Valley. In October the trains moved to Cheo Reo to support operations and relied on convoys from base camp for their resupply. When the battalion moved to the Ban Me Thuot area the trains relocated to Ban Blech and resupplied by CH 47 and HU-1H. Once again the trains displaced this time to Dak To in November along with the battalion and during the operation provided excellent support. When the battalion moved to Plei Mrong at the close of the year the trains moved to base camp. The logistical portion of the battalion operated smoothly and efficiently with occasional difficulties quickly corrected.

## SECTION IV: Civic Action

Civic Action performed by the Civil Affairs Team, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry in the year 1967 was directed towards helping Montagnards to help themselves. Three villages were assigned to the Civil Affairs Team from January through October and then four more villages were assigned. The villages that the team was responsible for were Plei Wet, Plei Groi, Plei Blo, Plei Chop Nhui, Plei Bul Dur and Plei Bia Tih all located northeast of the Division Base Camp. The team had one officer and from 5 to 11 members. Problems areas were sickness, cuts, bruises, sanitation, schools, water purification and a better will to cooperate with the Civil Affairs Team. These problems were met with an eager spirit and can do attitude.

In order for the people to receive medical care a trained medical aid-man was assigned to the Civil Affairs Team. He not only treated cuts, bruises and minor skin irritations but recommended persons to be evacuated to the hospital and other aid stations. Tools obtained through RVN officials were given to the villagers for their gardens and to provide a means to clean up their villages. English and Vietnamese classes were taught to the villagers with outstanding results. Even though English seems unimportant it was taught so that the villagers could converse with the Americans. Classes were attended with eagerness by both adults and children.

In order to have a place to meet and possibly to employ a full time school teacher for the villages, the villagers with the help of the Civil Affairs Team built schools in Plei Blo, Plei Bia Tih and Plei Chop Nhui. The villagers worked with the Civil Affairs Team and gained a fair degree of knowledge in carpentry.

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The Civil Affairs Team did not do all the giving. The villagers in-

formed the Civil Affairs Team when VC were in the area and also pointed out numerous mines left by the VC that could have resulted in US casualties.

Efforts in the forward area were the same as those in the Base Camp area, with more emphasis placed on PSYOPS.